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CLD-111        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3665 
___________ 
 
RAFAEL ANTONIO JOSEPH, 
                                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE; 
 MS. BEEBAR; JONES; MOSES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL 
 CAPACITY AS SOCIAL WORKERS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-01993) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted By the Clerk for Possible Dismissal Due to a  
Jurisdictional Defect and Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 12, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: February 25, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Rafael Antonio Joseph appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders dismissing 
his claims.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Joseph filed a complaint against the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare 
(“DPW”) alleging that, in March of 2013, it denied his application for food-stamp 
benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program because he did not 
establish that his previous receipt of such benefits from New Mexico had ceased.  Joseph 
claims that DPW’s denial of benefits was in violation of state and federal law because 
DPW should have taken further steps to verify cessation of New Mexico benefits itself 
and should have relied on a letter from the Social Security Administration stating that he 
does not receive federal benefits.  Joseph further claims that DPW’s denial requires him 
to eat his meals at homeless shelters and that those meals interfere with his medication.   
 The District Court dismissed Joseph’s complaint on the ground that DPW is 
immune from federal suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and Joseph filed an amended 
complaint containing essentially the same allegations and naming as additional 
defendants three DPW social workers involved with his case.  He identified these 
individuals as “Ms. Beebar,” “Ms. Jones” and “Ms. Moses,” and he named them “in their 
official capacity as social workers.”  By order entered May 28, 2013, the District Court 
dismissed the amended complaint against DPW, again on Eleventh Amendment grounds, 
                                                                                                                                                  
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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and directed the United States Marshal to serve process on the individual defendants.  
The Marshal ultimately served Jones and Moses but was unable to serve Beebar because  
DPW employed no one by that name.   
 Jones and Moses filed a motion to dismiss Joseph’s amended complaint on 
multiple grounds, including that he could not state a due process claim because 
Pennsylvania provides an adequate remedy for the denial of benefits—i.e., an 
administrative review process that includes review as of right by the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court.  See 55 Pa. Code §§ 275.1-275.4.1  After Joseph’s deadline to 
respond to that motion expired, the District Court ordered him to respond and warned 
him that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the action against Jones and Moses.  
Joseph failed to respond, and the District Court dismissed his claims against Jones and 
Moses without prejudice by order entered January 6, 2014. 
 One month later, the District Court ordered Joseph to show cause why it should  
not dismiss the action against Beebar, the only remaining defendant, for failure to serve 
her with process within the time required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).2  The District Court 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Joseph attached to his initial complaint a form indicating that he instituted this process 
by submitting a “fair hearing” request to DPW, but he has not alleged the status of that 
proceeding. 
 
2 The District Court granted Joseph leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which required 
officers of the court to serve process, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), but Joseph was required to 
take “‘reasonable steps . . . to identify for the court the defendants named in the 
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once again warned Joseph that his failure to respond would result in dismissal of the 
action.  Joseph once again failed to respond, and the District Court dismissed the action 
without prejudice as to Beebar as well.  Joseph appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.3 
II. 
 Joseph’s appeal brings two issues before us.  The first is the District Court’s  
dismissal of his claims against DPW on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.  We 
exercise plenary review over that issue.  See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 
                                                                                                                                                  
complaint.’”  Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 
3 Joseph initially did not file a notice of appeal and instead filed a mandamus petition 
with this Court, which we denied but transferred to the District Court to be treated as a 
timely motion to extend his time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).  See In re 
Joseph, 574 F. App’x 61, 62-63 (3d Cir. 2014).  Joseph later filed a notice of appeal and 
the District Court granted his Rule 4(a)(5) motion.  That ruling rendered Joseph’s notice 
timely, see, e.g., Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1993); Consol. 
Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 827 F.2d 916, 921 (3d Cir. 1987), and was 
otherwise jurisdictionally proper, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).  We 
previously questioned whether the District Court’s orders of dismissal are final because 
they dismissed Joseph’s claims without prejudice, but we also noted that a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute and without leave to amend can constitute a final order, see In re 
Joseph, 574 F. App’x at 62 n.1, and we stated that “the District Court, if it intended to 
enter anything other than a final order, can provide such clarification as may be 
appropriate” in considering Joseph’s Rule 4(a)(5) motion, id. at 62.  The District Court 
did not specify that it considered its orders non-final and, to the contrary, its grant of 
Joseph’s Rule 4(a)(5) motion suggests that it views the matter as concluded.  The District 
Court also did not grant Joseph leave to further amend and has marked the action 
“closed.”  Thus, we are satisfied that the District Court’s orders of dismissal are final and 
that we otherwise have jurisdiction under § 1291. 
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F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).  Having done so, we agree that Joseph’s claims against 
DPW are barred by the Eleventh Amendment for the reasons adequately explained by the 
District Court.  See also id. at 254-55 (holding that “the DPW is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity because it is an administrative agency without existence apart  
from the Commonwealth”). 
 The second issue is the District Court’s dismissal of Joseph’s claims against the 
individual defendants.  We construe both dismissals as ones under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) 
for failure to prosecute, and we review them for abuse of discretion.  See In re Asbestos 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2013).  We discern none here.  
Although District Courts generally must consider certain factors before taking the drastic 
step of dismissing a complaint with prejudice, see id. (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)), the District Court in this case dismissed Joseph’s 
claims without prejudice.  Its rulings are final for § 1291 purposes as discussed above, 
but they were not effectively dismissals with prejudice because no conceivably applicable 
statute of limitations had run when the District Court entered its orders.  Thus, the 
District Court’s rulings permitted Joseph to pursue any state-court remedies he may have 
following the state’s administrative review process, which it appears he has invoked.4 
                                              
4 We note that we have liberally and thoroughly reviewed Joseph’s complaint and 
amended complaint and discern no conceivably plausible federal claim, largely for the 
reasons that Jones and Moses argued in their motion to dismiss.   
 6 
 
 Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the District Court acted within its 
discretion in dismissing these claims without prejudice.  In each instance, the District 
Court expressly warned Joseph that it would dismiss his amended complaint as to these 
defendants if Joseph failed to respond as the District Court directed and, in each instance, 
Joseph failed to respond.  Joseph does not claim on appeal that he did not receive these  
orders.  To the contrary, he argues that the orders were “confusing and baffling” and that 
he was partially homeless and devoting his available time to litigating other cases.  
Joseph does not explain how these circumstances prevented him from complying with the 
District Court’s orders, and he did not raise them before the District Court in the first 
instance.  We decline to hold that the District Court abused its discretion on the basis of 
arguments that Joseph could have presented to it but did not. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders entered May 28, 2013, 
January 6, 2014, and February 26, 2014.  Our ruling is without prejudice to Joseph’s 
ability to seek such relief from the denial of benefits as may be available in state court.  
We express no opinion on the merits of any claim he may have in that regard. 
